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Equity and Debt Issuance by Firms Violating GAAP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine security issuance in restated periods by firms that misreport financial 
statements and find that only a small percent of such firms issues securities in the restated 
period. Investors are misled by mistakes made by firms issuing equity more so than other 
restating firms at the initial announcement of misreported earnings, but are not misled by 
mistakes made by debt-issuing firms. Equity-issuing firms that manage earnings to beat 
analyst expectations experience abnormally high returns in the restated period prior to 
security issuance. Firms that restated more reports and have higher pre-mistake returns 
are more likely to issue equity. High leverage, firm size and number of restated periods 
are positively associated with the likelihood of debt issuance by restating firms.   
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1.  Introduction 
We study equity and debt issuance in restated periods by firms that violate 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP).1 Prior literature suggests that one of 
the reasons firms violate GAAP is to reduce the cost of security issuance (Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeny (1996), Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2003), Burns and Kedia (2006), 
Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006)). These studies find that firms that restate 
financial statements or are subject to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
enforcement actions for financial reporting violations (AAERs) raise more capital than 
control firms during violation periods. They also find that security issuance in the 
violation period increases the likelihood of a restatement or an AAER. They interpret 
these results as evidence that firms manage earnings to issue securities at better prices. 
However, these results are weak evidence to suggest that restating firms violate 
GAAP in order to issue securities at inflated prices. For example, it is plausible that when 
equity and debt issuance is motivated by other considerations, it results in higher scrutiny 
of the firm’s accounting by managers, auditors, the SEC and other market participants 
and thus increases the likelihood of a restatement or an AAER. Another explanation for 
high security issuance in the restated period is the successful market timing by 
management. Above mentioned studies also find that firms restating financial statements 
experience abnormally high performance prior to the first restated year. Therefore, 
abnormally high firm performance prior to misreporting can be driving both security 
issuance and the likelihood of misreporting. In fact, Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson 
(2006) find that security issuance does not explain the likelihood of a restatement when 
                                                 
1 Restated period is defined as the period between the beginning of the first restated year or quarter and the 
date of restatement announcement. 
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the pre-misstatement price run up is included as an explanatory variable. This result is 
consistent with Jensen’s (2005) theory of overvalued equity which suggests that 
overpricing leads to value destructive behavior, such as earnings management. 
Furthermore, none of these papers test whether erroneous accounting prior to security 
issuance is associated with misvaluation in the restated period.  
The main contribution of this paper is that it goes beyond the analysis of the 
frequency of security issuance in the restated period and tests whether restating firms 
experience abnormally high performance in the period after GAAP violation but before 
security issuance, and whether this performance is related to the magnitude of accounting 
misrepresentation relative to expectations. This paper is also the first to examine which 
restating firms are more likely to issue equity and debt. 
We analyze 446 US firms that restated financial statements due to violations of 
GAAP during the period from January 1, 1996 to June 30, 2002. A sample of restating 
firms provides a unique setting for studying the impact of the quality of financial 
information on security issuance because ex post one observes the date and the nature of 
mistakes in financial statements and the date of the correction of those mistakes. We read 
restatement announcements to determine which financial reports were restated and the 
impact of restatement on net income. Our research design allows us to directly test 
whether overstatement of reported earnings is associated with investors over optimism 
about firm prospects prior to equity and debt issuance. Unlike prior studies that examined 
security issuance by restating firms (Burns and Kedia (2006), Efendi, Srivastava and 
Swanson (2006)), we focus on actual security issuance rather than balance sheet proxies.  
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We find that only a small percent of restating firms issues securities in the restated 
period: 15% of restating firms issue equity and 6% issue debt in the restated period, 
compared with 9% of control firms issuing equity and 4% issuing debt.2 The difference 
between the frequencies of security issuance is statistically significant. Although the 
percent of restating firms issuing securities is higher than the percent of control firms 
issuing securities, the number of issuances in the restated period is small to argue that 
security issuance is the dominant reason for violating GAAP - only 20% of firms issue 
either equity or debt. Therefore, 80% of restating firms were not motivated by security 
issuance to violate GAAP. Moreover, not all restating firms that issue equity manage 
earnings upward. Nineteen percent of equity issuing firms and twenty one percent of debt 
issuing firms understate net income prior to the issuance. If the firm understates net 
income prior to security issuance, it will not obtain financing at more favorable terms. 
Therefore, security issuance could not be a rational motivation for downward earnings 
management. Overall, the results suggest that there is no strong connection between the 
act of restatement and security issuance. 
If some firms violate GAAP to reduce financing costs, then we should observe 
positive association between abnormal return at the announcement of earnings and the 
mistake, adjusted for expected earnings. We test this proposition by examining whether 
investors are misled by mistakes in reported earnings prior to equity and debt issuance. 
Following Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011) we decompose reported earnings into 
correctly stated component and mistake and examine abnormal returns at the initial 
                                                 
2 Control firms are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period January 1, 
1995 to June 30, 2002 in the same two digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size (market 
value) and book-to-market, measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of restatement, and have 
sufficient data to calculate returns one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement. 
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earnings as a function of these numbers relative to expectations. Expectations are 
measured as consensus analyst forecasts. We find that investors attach the same valuation 
coefficient to the erroneous component of earnings as they do to the true earnings. 
Investors are more misled by mistakes made by equity issuing firms prior to the issuance, 
but are not misled by mistakes prior to debt issuance. For equity-issuing firms that 
manage earnings to beat analyst expectations abnormal returns persist beyond 
announcement window – such firms experience abnormally high returns in the restated 
period prior to security issuance. Interestingly, for equity issuing firms there is little 
evidence of abnormal performance before the mistakes are made, which suggests that the 
abnormal performance prior to equity issuance is caused by earnings management. 
Overall our results suggest that a small number of firms that violate GAAP and 
subsequently issue equity mislead investors. 
We also examine which types of firms in the cross-section are most likely to use 
earnings management to issue equity and debt. We find that restating firms that issue 
equity are larger in market value terms than non-issuing firms, have higher pre-mistake 
return, make smaller downward revisions of net income and restate more reports. 
Restating firms that issue debt are considerably larger, more highly levered, and make 
smaller downward revisions of net income than non-issuing firms and firms issuing 
equity. Restating firms that issue debt restate more reports than non-issuing firms, but not 
firms issuing equity.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is the first paper to 
examine whether firm performance is abnormal subsequent to GAAP violations before 
equity and debt issuances and whether such performance is associated with the magnitude 
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of the restatement. Prior literature assumed that if the firm issues securities in the restated 
period, the issuance follows the period of abnormal performance induced by earnings 
management (Burns and Kedia (2006), Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006), Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1996)). This paper provides a direct test of this claim. Because the 
adverse impact of restatements on shareholder wealth at restatement announcement has 
been used to motivate a number of regulations, including some provisions in the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002 (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004)), Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005)), it is important to understand the full impact of restatements on financial markets. 
Second, this is the first paper to document the frequency of equity and debt issuance in 
the restated period and examine characteristics of restating firms issuing securities. The 
results of this paper complement the growing stream of literature studying the causes and 
consequences of financial misreporting, and show that contrary to prior beliefs, security 
issuance at inflated prices by restating firms is not prevalent.  
Moreover, this paper provides a test of the earnings management hypothesis 
posed by Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) for firms violating GAAP. The earnings 
management hypothesis suggests that firms pursue aggressive accounting practices prior 
to equity issuance. Such practices mislead investors and cause them to overvalue security 
issuance. However, as the true value of earnings is revealed, investors devalue firms that 
manage earnings. To test the earnings management hypothesis, Teoh, Welch and Wong 
(1998b) used abnormal accruals prior to equity issuance as a proxy for earnings 
management.3 However, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), Shivakumar (2000), and 
                                                 
3 A finding that is common to studies that examine earnings management prior to seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs), convertible debt issuance, initial public offerings (IPOs) or stock-financed acquisitions is that firms 
that engage in such activities on average contain positive abnormal accrual components prior to the event, 
that the accruals are negatively related to post-event stock returns, and that accruals tend to reverse during 
 6
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) among others show that abnormal accruals is a poor 
measure of earnings management prior to security issuance.4 The advantage of testing the 
earnings management hypothesis using a sample of restatements is that ex post one 
observes the details of accounting misreporting. However, accrual management is a more 
common practice, which does not impose the large costs of financial misrepresentation 
that are associated with restatements. Therefore, while this study extends the prior 
literature that tested the earnings management hypothesis using accruals, its results are 
not directly comparable to that stream of literature. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and 
outlines hypotheses tested in this paper.  Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents 
results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
A firm is required to file a prior period adjustment of financial statements 
whenever it discovers material discrepancies in previously filed financial statements. 
Restatements result in significant negative market reaction (Akhigbe, Kudla and Madura 
(2005) and Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004)) that is spilled over to firms in the 
same industry (Akhigbe and Madura (2008)). Markets anticipate financial statement 
                                                                                                                                                 
the post-event period (Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, b) and Rangan (1998), Friedlan (1994), DuCharme, 
Malatesta, and Sefcik (2001)), Erickson and Wang (1998), Christie and Zimmerman (1994), and Urcan and 
Kieschnick (2006)). 
4 Shivakumar (2000) points out four problems with using discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management around large events such as SEOs, IPOs, and mergers. First, such events are frequently 
associated with unusually large changes to working capital, independent of any earnings management. 
Second, many studies estimate accruals from balance sheet changes in working capital, not by taking them 
from cash flow statements. Third, accrual models commonly used to estimate earnings management are 
mis-specified. Fourth, such events frequently involve substantial expenses that might be unpaid prior to the 
event and hence are accrued at the balance date, resembling income increasing discretionary accruals. 
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restatements as early as half way through the restated period (Bardos, Golec, Harding 
(2011)). Restatements lead to an increase in a firm’s cost of capital (Hribar and Jenkins 
(2004), Bardos, Cline and Koutmos (2011), and Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008), Bardos 
(2011)), and increase the likelihood of litigations (Palmrose and Scholz (2004), Bradley, 
Cline and Lian (2010)). 
Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2003) find that 452 firms restating during the 1988-
2000 period attracted more external capital than non-restating firms in the period of 
alleged manipulation. They compare the standardized sum of additional cash raised from 
common and preferred stock and long-term debt for restating versus non-restating firms 
matched by industry and size during the period of alleged manipulation. Burns and Kedia 
(2007) analyze a sample of 215 firms restating over a period from 1995 through 2002. 
They find some evidence that restating firms raise more funds in misreported years than 
non-restating S&P 1,500 firms in univariate, but not in multivariate settings. Efendi, 
Srivastava and Swanson (2006) find that firms making restatements in 2001 and 2002 
raise more funds in the first misstated year than control firms matched on size and book-
to-market.5 The paper does not examine security issuance beyond the first misstated year. 
These studies interpreted the result that restating firms issue more external funds 
than control samples as evidence in favor of the earnings management hypothesis, i.e., 
firms manage earnings to issue securities at more favorable prices. There are several 
problems with such inference. First, there are other potential explanations for the 
                                                 
5 In a related paper, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) studied 92 firms that were subject to SEC 
enforcement actions for financial reporting violations (AAERs) between 1978 and 1990. They report that 
the main motivation as cited by the SEC for earnings management was to issue securities at inflated prices. 
They also find that the AAER sample raises more external funds than control sample. The paper did not 
investigate whether or not funds were issued at a lower cost than they would have been in the absence of 
earnings management. 
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observed result. It has been shown by the same studies that misstatements follow periods 
of stock price run-up. Therefore, a higher number of issuances by restating firms in a 
restated period can simply be the result of a manager’s ability to time the market. Indeed 
many studies find that firms issue equity when their shares are overpriced (Jung, Kim and 
Stulz (1996), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), (Dittmar and Thakor (2007), 
Asquith and Mullins (1986), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and Burch, Christie, and Nanda 
(2004)). Another plausible explanation for this result is that firms that issue securities are 
more likely to restate as they face greater scrutiny by the SEC, auditors and investors than 
non-issuing firms. Third, these papers did not test whether erroneous reporting that leads 
to restatements inflates security prices prior to security issuance and therefore allows 
management to issue securities at more favorable prices.  
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing whether material mistakes in 
financial statements allow restating firms to reduce financing costs. We study a sample of 
firms that restated financial statements during 1997-2002. For these firms we can ex post 
identify financial reports which contained mistakes as well as the size of the mistakes 
(see Figure 1). We can also determine if the firms issued securities in the restated period.  
 
Equity or Debt
 issuance date  
 
  Mistake Restatement
Pre-mistake period 
  -b   +a 
Post-restatement period 
Restatement 
Announcement date
Beginning of the 1st 
restated period 
Restated period 
Issuance
Time 
 
Figure 1: Mistake is the beginning of the first restated period, Issuance is the date of equity or debt 
issuance, Restatement is the date of the restatement announcement, -b and +a are time periods of interest. 
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If security issuance at favorable prices is one of the main motivations for 
misreporting earnings as suggested by prior studies, then one should observe a higher 
frequency of security issuance by restating firms relative to control firms in the restated 
period. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Restating firms issue more equity and debt than control firms. 
We examine the number of equity and debt issuances in the restated period 
relative to a sample of control firms. Unlike prior studies that use the sum of funds raised 
through equity and debt obtained from Compustat, we use security issuance data from 
Securities Data Corporation, which allows us to determine the precise timing of the 
issuance. 
As noted earlier, even if hypothesis 1 is supported, this would not imply that 
material mistakes in financial statements reduced financing costs of restating firms. The 
likelihood of security issuance and the likelihood of restatement can be driven by the 
same variable, such as overvaluation in the pre-mistake period. Security issuance in the 
restated period can increase the likelihood of restatement due to additional scrutiny of 
financial statements by management, auditors, regulators and other market participants.  
To test whether misreporting allows restating firms to issue securities at more 
favorable prices, we examine whether material mistakes of issuing firms result in 
misvaluation. If investors are misled by material mistakes in reported earnings then they 
would price the error component of earnings the same way as they price the true earnings. 
For example, if the error puts the firm in line with expectations, then there should be no 
abnormal performance at the announcement of earnings. Similarly, if overstated earnings 
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cause the firm to beat expectations that may generate positive abnormal performance. 
Most of the action will take place at the announcement of earnings.  
A well established result in the literature is that earnings announcement returns 
are positively related to unexpected earnings (Ball and Brown (1968), Collins and 
Kothari (1989)). Abnormal return  at the earnings announcement at time t is a function 
of the difference between reported earnings  and expected earnings . The 
difference between reported and expected earnings 
tR
tI )(IE tt-1
)(IEI tt-t 1−  has been termed 
standardized earnings surprise SUE: 
 tttt-tt εbαε))(IE(IbαR ++=+−+= t111 SUE ,   (1) 
The coefficient b1 is called the earnings response coefficient (ERC). 
Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011) study whether investors are misled by 
misstated earnings by estimating whether investors attach the same earnings response 
coefficient to the misstated earnings as they do to the true component of earnings. 
Specifically, they estimate the following equation: 
 ttttttt-tt εbbαεMb))(IE(IbαR +++=++−+= MISTAKESUE 21211 ,   (2) 
where Mt (MISTAKE) is the amount by which earnings are misstated,  is market 
adjusted return for a 3 day window (-1; +1) relative to the earnings announcement on day 
zero. They find that coefficient  is positive and equal to , suggesting that investors 
are fooled by mistakes in financial statements and treat misstated component of earnings 
the same way that they treat the correctly stated component.  
tR
2b 1b
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If firms violate GAAP to reduce financing costs, then we should observe positive 
association between abnormal return at the announcement of earnings and the mistake, 
adjusted for expected earnings.  
H2: There is a positive association between abnormal earnings announcement 
returns and mistake in reported earnings for firms issuing equity and debt. 
 
To test hypothesis 2, we estimate the following two models: 
 ,    (3) 
tttttt
ttt
εbbb
bbαR
++++
++=
MISTAKE*EquitySUE*EquityEquity
MISTAKESUE
543
21
 ,          (4) 
tttttt
ttt
εbbb
bbαR
++++
++=
MISTAKE*DebtSUE*DebtDebt
MISTAKESUE
543
21
Equity (Debt) is a dummy that equals one for quarters in the restated period 
preceding equity (debt) issuance. For example, if a firm restated financial statements for 
1999 and 2000 fiscal years and issued equity in November of 1999, then Equity will 
equal one for the first three quarters of 1999 (provided that the 3rd quarter is announced 
prior to equity issuance announcement).  
If investors are misled by mistakes in financial reports of equity and debt issuing 
firms, then  and 052 >+ bb 4152 bbbb +=+ . If investors are only partly fooled, 
then . We estimate equations (3) and (4) using OLS regression. For each 
firm, we include all quarters in the restated period – in this period MISTAKE is non zero. 
To provide a benchmark for the estimation in the restated period, for each firm we 
include quarters for two years preceding the restated period and cluster errors by firm. As 
a result, usual performance of the firm in pre-restatement period is used as its own 
control. Clustering standard errors by firm also corrects for cross-sectional and time-
series dependence (Petersen (2009)). 
41 bb +52 bb <+
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If the issuing firms manage earnings to beat expectations (MISTAKE>SUE) and 
if investors are fooled by the mistakes (hypothesis 2 holds) the misvaluation might persist 
over the longer time period. Firms that beat expectations by a greater amount should 
experience greater misvaluation. Issuing firms, whose earnings management merely puts 
them in line with expectations, will simply experience normal performance over an 
extended period.  
H3: If SUE<0 and MISTAKE>SUE, issuing firms will experience abnormal 
performance in the restated period before security issuance.  
 
To test hypothesis 3 we examine abnormal returns in the restated period until 
security issuance (period (Mistake, Issuance)) relative to several benchmarks: usual 
performance of the firm itself, control firm and the market.6  
Lastly, we examine which types of firms in the cross-section are most likely to 
use earnings management to issue equity and debt. We also study whether there is a 
difference in earnings management between debt versus equity issuance. As discussed in 
the introduction and the result section, only a small percent of restating firms issue equity 
and debt.  Because of the small sample size, we focus only on a few key characteristics to 
preserve the degrees of freedom in multivariate analysis. 
An established result in the literature is that firms issue equity after periods of 
run-up in stock prices (Baker and Wurgler (2002)).  Prior literature has also shown that 
restating firms make mistakes in financial statements following periods of abnormally 
high performance (Burns and Kedia (2007), Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006)). 
Therefore, we should expect firms with better pre-mistake performance to be more likely 
to issue equity than debt.  
                                                 
6 Calculation of abnormal returns is discussed in detail in section 4.4.  
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H4: Firms with better pre-mistake performance are more likely to issue equity. 
Several studies find that firms close to violating lending covenants manage 
earnings (Sweeney (1994), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994)), and Dechow et al. (1996)). 
These studies suggest that avoidance of penalties associated with the violations of debt 
covenants is a motivation to manage earnings. A firm would manage earnings to issue 
new debt if earnings management allows the firm to obtain debt at more favorable terms. 
A firm that meets restrictive covenants can obtain more favorable financing. Prior studies 
use leverage as a proxy for the pressure firms feel to manage earnings (Richardson et al 
(2002), Burns and Kedia (2007)). 
H5: Firms with higher leverage are more likely to issue debt. 
We examine whether firms that issue equity and debt differ from non issuing 
firms in terms of restatement characteristics. If issuing firms make larger mistakes, this 
would suggest that they have a longer distance to their earnings threshold. Issuing firms 
are more likely to have longer restated period because the likelihood of any event is 
greater during a longer time period. We also control for firm size in multivariate analysis. 
 
3. Data 
 
We collected a sample of US firms that announced restatements of financial 
statements between January 1997 and June 2002. We searched Lexis-Nexis database 
using key words “restatement”, “restat”, “revis”, “adjust”, “error” and “responding to 
guidance from the SEC”. We crossed checked search results with the sample released by 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Unlike the GAO sample, we excluded 
restatements that were caused by an adoption of new accounting rules, and retained only 
restatements due to a mistake or an improper interpretation of GAAP rules. After 
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identifying the sample of companies announcing restatements, we searched for the 
originally filed and restated financial statements on Lexis-Nexis (Forms 10-K/A(s) and 
Forms 10-Q/A(s)). The following data was collected from restatement announcements 
and original and restated financial statements: date of the announcement of restatement, 
years and quarters restated, original and restated net income. 
The search resulted in 536 restatements made by 496 firms. We imposed several 
other filters. Some firms restated more than once during the sample period. In several 
cases restated periods of multiple restatements by the same firm overlapped. To avoid 
double counting security issuance, we deleted 29 restatements that had overlapping 
restated periods. The later of the two restatements with overlapping restated periods was 
deleted. Second, we deleted 20 restatements for which the impact on net income was zero 
or could not be identified. Third, we deleted 6 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). 
Because REITs are required to pay out 90% of their reported net income in dividends, 
they may have different considerations when deciding whether to issue equity or debt. 
Fourth, 35 observations were lost because these firms did not have data in Compustat to 
find a matching firm. The final sample consists of 446 restatements by 436 firms. Ten 
firms restated financial statements twice during the restated period (Table 1, Panel A). 
Return data is from CRSP. Financial data was obtained from Compustat. Information on 
equity and debt issuance is taken from the Securities Data Corporation database (SDC 
Platinum). 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
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4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, Panel B shows the distribution of restatements by year, which is similar 
to that of prior studies. There was an increase in restatements in 1999 and 2000. Note that 
2002 restatements were collected only through July. As a result, all restatements in the 
sample precede the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and are made in a common 
regulatory environment.  Table 1, Panel C shows distribution of restatement 
characteristics. An average firm restates 1.34 annual reports. Table 1, Panel C also shows 
the distribution of the magnitude of the mistake, which is measured as the difference 
between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by the 
absolute value of the originally reported net income (ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI)). This measure 
is heavily skewed, with the mean falling below the first quartile. The median reduction of 
previously reported net income is -23% for the full sample. Table 1, Panel C also shows 
the distribution of the ΔNI/Assets, which is the difference between restated net income 
and originally reported net income, standardized by book value of total assets measured 
one year prior to restatement announcement. This measure of mistake shows similar 
pattern as does ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI). However, ΔNI/Assets is considerably less skewed. 
Therefore, we rely more on the tests using ΔNI/Assets. Table 1, Panel D shows that the 
majority of restating firms revise net income downward at restatement announcement 
(downward restatements).  Only 13.7% of our sample revises net income upward at 
restatement announcement (upward restatements). Panel E shows that downward 
restatements are of greater magnitude than upward restatements.  
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Table 2, Panel A shows selected characteristics of restating firms one fiscal year 
prior to the announcement of restatement. The mean (median) market value of restating 
firms is $2,259 million ($183 million). The mean (median) book value of restating firms 
is $2,375 million ($223 million). The mean leverage is 18.45% and the mean book-to-
market ratio is 0.63. 
Table 2, Panel B shows the characteristics of control firms in the year in which 
the matching is performed (one year prior to the restatement announcement). Control 
firms are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period 
January 1, 1996 to June 30, 2002 in the same two digit SIC code as restating firm, that 
are the closest in size and book-to-market and have sufficient data to calculate returns one 
year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement. Market value and book-to-
market ratios of restating firms are measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of 
restatement.  
Table 2, Panel C compares characteristics of restating and control firms using 2-
tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test. The samples do not differ in terms of size and book-to-
market, which indicates a successful match. They also do not differ in terms of the book 
value of assets. Restating firms are more highly levered than control firms. On average, 
restating firms have a capital structure that has 2% more debt. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.2. Equity and debt issuance 
Results presented in Table 3 and Table 4 show that restating firms issue more 
equity and debt in the restated period than non-restating firms. Table 3, Panel A shows 
frequency of equity issuance by restating and control firms in the restated period. 
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Restated period is defined as the period between the beginning of the period of the first 
mistake (year or quarter) and the restatement announcement. There are 85 equity 
issuances made by 68 restating firms. The number of equity issuances by restating firms 
is surprisingly low. Only fifteen percent of restatements have equity issuance in restated 
period. Control firms issue less equity. Forty one control firms issue equity in 48 matched 
restated periods. This supports hypothesis 1 and suggests that equity issuance serves as a 
motivation for some restating firms. 
The majority of restating and control firms issue equity only once (78% of 
restating firms and 85% of the control firms). Thirteen of restating firms and five of 
control firms issue equity twice, two of restating firms issue equity three times and one of 
control firms issues equity four times (Table 3, Panel B). Restating firms raise more 
equity per issuance: $110 million versus $82 million per control firm, however the 
difference is not statistically significant. Both restating and control firms raise non-trivial 
amounts of equity as a percent of total assets: 33.74% and 40.67% for restating firms and 
control firms, respectively.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 shows the same statistics for debt issuance in the restated period.7 We 
find that while fewer restating firms issue debt than equity in the restated period (6.28%), 
many firms raise debt more than once in restated period and raise more funds per 
issuance. Similar pattern is seen for control firms. There are more debt issuances in 
restated period by restating firms than control firms. However, the difference in the 
                                                 
7 Number of debt issuances figures in Table 4 combine straight and convertible debt issuance. Statistics for 
the two types of issuances are combined because of very small number of convertible debt issuances. There 
are four convertible debt issuances by restating firms and three by control firms. Small number of 
observations does not allow further statistics analysis of convertible debt issuance. All results are 
unaffected by exclusion of convertible debt issuances. 
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number of firms raising debt between restating and control sub-samples is not statistically 
significant (28 restating firms versus 18 control firms). Therefore, hypothesis 1 is not 
supported for debt issuance. Moreover, control firms raise more per issuance: the mean 
issuance size is $167.96 million (1.91% of total assets) for restating firms and $216.56 
million (2.88% of total assets) for control firms. This difference is statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Interestingly, not all restating firms that issue equity manage earnings upward. 
We find that 13 out of 68 restating firms that issued equity in the restated period 
understated net income; and 6 out of 28 debt issuing firms understated net income. We 
call firms that understated net income and as a result had to revise net income upward as 
upward restatements. If the firm understates net income prior to security issuance, it will 
not obtain financing at more favorable terms. Therefore, security issuance could not be a 
rational reason for downward earnings management. We focus our analysis on 55 equity 
issuing and 22 debt issuing firms that restate net income downward (downward 
restatements).  
 
4.3. Market reaction to initial announcement of misstated earnings  
In this section we test hypothesis 2 by analyzing market reaction to the initial 
announcement of misstated earnings. We calculate SUE as standardized earnings surprise 
based on Street earnings reported in I/B/E/S because Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) find 
that Street earnings are more directly comparable with analysts’ forecasts. As a result, 
earnings surprise is more precisely measured using Street earnings. We follow Bardos, 
Golec and Harding (2011) in calculating correctly stated earnings. SUE is the difference 
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between correctly stated earnings and consensus analyst forecasts. The consensus analyst 
forecast is calculated as the median of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to 
the earnings announcement, considering only the most recent forecast for each analyst. 
SUE and Mistake are standardized by the stock price. Earnings announcement dates are 
obtained from I/B/E/S. We are able to identify sufficient data for estimating equations 
(1)-(4) for 1,843 quarters corresponding to 226 firms. Of these firms, only 22 issued 
equity and 13 issued debt in the restated period.  is calculated as market adjusted 
return using equally weighted CRSP market index as a proxy for the market return.
tR
8 
Table 5, Panels A and D show descriptive statistics for , SUE and Mistake for 
various sub-samples. For the full sample, both the mean and the median  is positive 
and equals .12% and .45%, respectively. SUE is negative, with the mean of -0.0042 and 
Mistake is positive with the mean of 0.0026. We show separate table for the restated 
period sample, during which Mistake is not equal zero. Interestingly, for this sub-sample 
both mean and median  is negative and equals -1.02% and -.13%, respectively. The 
median Mistake almost exactly offsets the negative median SUE, suggesting that firms 
manage earnings to simply meet (rather than beat) expectations. Panels C and D show 
descriptive statistics for equity issuing and debt issuing firms for the restated period 
quarters. Both Mistake and SUE are larger for equity sub-sample. For debt issuing firms 
mean and median mistake does not put the firms in line with expectation since SUE is 
negative and in absolute terms larger than Mistake.  
tR
tR
tR
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
                                                 
8 Results are robust to using equally weighted index. 
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Table 5 Panel E shows regression results for the full sample. Model 1 estimates 
equation (1) and is consistent with prior literature. It finds that abnormal returns at 
earnings announcement are a positive function of earnings surprise. Model (2) estimates 
equation (2) and confirms results in Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011) that investors 
attach positive valuation to the erroneous component of earnings and value them the 
same way as correctly stated earnings (as suggested by positive b2 which equals b1). 
We test hypothesis 2 by estimating Models 3 and 4 (Table 5, Panel E). Model 3 
estimates equation (3), which shifts all coefficients for equity issuing firms. We find that 
the dummy coefficient Equity is negative and significant, suggesting that overall  is 
lower than for the rest of the sample. This result is consistent with univariate statistics - 
 is lower in Panel C than in Panels A and B. For equity issuing firms, the total 
coefficient on SUE and Mistake 
tR
tR
)( 41 bb + )( 52 bb + are positive and significant. As for the 
full sample, these two coefficients are equal each other for equity issuing firms. 
Significance of the coefficient on Mistake for equity issuing firms indicates that investors 
are misled by mistakes of such firms. Interestingly, we find that coefficient  on the 
interaction of SUE and Equity dummy is positive and significant. This shows that 
investors react more strongly to surprises in correctly stated component of earnings of 
equity issuing firms. This result suggests that equity issuing firms are overvalued. 
Similarly, we find that the coefficient on the interaction of Mistake and Equity dummy 
is positive and significant, suggesting that investors are more misled by mistakes made by 
equity issuing firms then other restating firms. 
4b
5b
Model 4 shows similar analysis for debt issuing firms. We find that investors are 
not misled by mistakes made by debt issuing firms ( )( 52 bb + is not significant). We also 
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find that the coefficient on SUE for debt issuing firms is not significant, suggesting that 
our sample might be too small to test predictions for debt issuing firms. Table 5 Panel F 
shows regression results for the downward restatements. All results are similar to those 
for the full sample (Panel E). 
Overall, we find support for hypothesis 2 for equity but not for debt issuing firms. 
 
4.4. Abnormal returns in the restated period before equity and debt issuance 
To test hypothesis 3 we examine abnormal returns in the restated period until 
security issuance (period (Mistake, Issuance)). This period begins after the restated 
earnings have been reported to the market (day +2) and end two days prior to the 
announcement of the security offer. For firms that are missing earnings announcement 
date, the start date is calculated as the end of the quarter plus 29 days, which is the 
average lag between the end of the quarter and the reporting date for our sample. 
To ensure robustness of the results, we calculate several measures of abnormal 
performance. First, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns prior to equity and debt 
issuance in restated period ( ). To calculate market model CAR, we first 
estimate market model parameters as follows. 
Issuance) (Mistake,CAR
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=         (5) 
where   is the return on firm i on day t,  is the return on the market index on day t 
(value-weighted CRSP market index), and 
itR mtR
itε  is a random error term. The abnormal 
stock return for security i on day t is defined as 
)(   
^^
mtiiitit RRARModelMarket βα +−=           (6) 
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Cumulative abnormal return is the sum of abnormal returns over period τ. We 
report daily CARs, since some of the periods of interest are firm specific. Daily CARs are 
calculated as CARs divided by the number of days over which accumulation occurred.  
We estimate market model parameters for 250 trading days starting on day -250 
relative to the beginning of the restated period. This window is chosen so that the same 
market model parameter estimates can be used to test whether CARs are abnormal one 
year before the beginning of restated period ( ). Unfortunately, only 32 of 
68 equity issuing firms have enough data to estimate market model parameters for this 
period. To recover some of the observations and to ensure the robustness of the results, 
we also estimate market model parameters for 250 days starting on day -5 relative to 
mistake. Table 6 shows that the results depend on the estimation period for market model 
parameters. Therefore, we estimated two more measures of abnormal performance: 
market adjusted abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
Mistake) year, (1CAR
Market adjusted abnormal return is calculated as  
mtitit RRARAdjustedMarket −=         (7) 
The advantage of using this return is that it does not require the estimation of the 
market model parameters and therefore leads to fewer lost observations. The drawback is 
that market adjusted return does not account for the market risk.  
Buy-and-hold return ( ) over period τ  for firm i is calculated as the 
geometric return.  represents the actual experience of an investor who passively 
holds a sample firm for period τ . 
τ,iBHR
τ,iBHR
, (1 )
T
i
t
itBHR Rτ = +∏ ,             (8) 
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where itR   is the i
th firm return on the tth day, and T  is the number of trading days 
in period τ.  Buy and hold abnormal return ( ,iBHAR τ ) is calculated as: 
, , (i i , )iBHAR BHR E BHRτ τ= − τ
)
 ,            (9) 
where ,( iE BHR τ  is the τ  period expected return for security i. We use two 
estimates of expected earnings. The first proxy is the performance of restating firm itself 
one year before the start of the restated period. The second proxy is the return on a size 
and book-to-market matched peer firm in the same industry (two digit SIC code) as the 
restating firm.9  We follow Lyon, Barber and Tsai’s (1999) approach to selecting among 
possible control firms. They showed that control firm approach yields well specified 
results when control firms are matched on size and book to market.10 Size is measured by 
the market value of equity.  Book-to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of equity book 
value to equity market value. Both size and book to market are calculated one year prior 
to restatement. We eliminate all restating firms from the pool of potential control firms. 
We also require control firms to have CRSP data at least one year prior to mistake and 
one year subsequent to restatement.  
First, we calculate returns in the period (Mistake, Issuance) for all firms issuing 
equity and debt (Table 6, Panels A and B). Table 7, Panel A shows restated period 
abnormal returns prior to equity issuance. We find that BHARs both relative to control 
firm and relative to pre-mistake period are positive and significant and equal 0.45% and 
0.31%, respectively. 11 Market adjusted CAR is also positive and significant. However, 
                                                 
9 Control firms for three companies had to be found within one digit SIC code to satisfy data requirements. 
10 They also show that when using this approach regular t statistics are well specified. 
11 The period between mistake and security issuance and between security issuance and restatement are 
firm specific. Therefore, we present daily abnormal returns in Table 6.  
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market model adjusted abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero for this 
period. Since BHARs are considered to be better measures of abnormal performance 
during longer periods, we conclude that equity issuing firms experience abnormally 
positive
s experience abnormally high returns in the restated period prior to 
securit
gesting that most of the overvaluation starts after the firm 
reports
 performance after mistake before security issuance.  
Next, we test hypothesis 3 by constraining the sample to only those firms for 
which MISTAKE>SUE before equity issuance. We calculate total SUE and total Mistake 
for the period (Mistake, Issuance) by adding SUE and Mistake for all quarters announced 
in this period.  Of the 22 firms issuing equity with available data for SUE, 16 (73%) 
make mistakes that allow them to beat expectations (MISTAKE>SUE). For all of this 
firms SUE<0, which means that in the absence of earnings management such firms would 
not have met analyst expectations. Unfortunately, the data is available only for 11 of 
these firms for calculation of abnormal returns. Despite small sample, we find that for 
these firms all measures of abnormal returns are positive and statistically significant.12 
This supports hypothesis 3 for equity issuing firms – firms that manage earnings to beat 
analyst expectation
y issuance.  
Table 6 Panel C shows abnormal returns one year before restated period for firms 
issuing equity in the restated period (1 Year, Mistake). Only market adjusted CAR is 
positive and significant, sug
 erroneous earnings.  
                                                 
12 Results are not tabulated for brevity. 
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Table 6 Panels B and D show that for debt issuing firms all returns are statistically 
insignificant from zero for the period (Mistake, Issuance) and (1 Year, Mistake).13 We do 
not report market model CARs, for which market model parameters are estimated during 
period (-254,-5), because estimation period for model parameters coincides with CAR 
period. Only market model CAR, with market model parameters estimated during the 
period (-501, -250) relative to mistake, is estimated for this window. This result is not 
t mistakes made by debt issuing firms do not cause 
misvalu
ting firms that issue equity in restated period have higher 
market
                      
surprising in light of the finding tha
ation even during a three day window at the announcement of misstated earnings. 
 
4.5. Characteristics of issuing firms 
Table 7 examines characteristics of restating firms conditional on security 
issuance for the full sample of restating firms.14 Panels A and B show characteristics of 
restating firms that do not issue securities in restated period and those that issue equity, 
respectively. Panel C compares these sub-samples using two-tailed Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test. We find that resta
 value and return one year before the start of the restated period. They have the 
same book value, leverage and book-to-market ratio compared to firms that do not issue 
securities in restated period.  
We find that firms that issue equity in restated period inflate net income less 
through erroneous accounting than non-issuing firms. This suggests that restating firms 
has shorter distance to the benchmark they are trying to meet. Despite this, as we showed 
in section 4.3, market reacts more strongly to surprises and mistakes made by restating 
                           
irms issuing debt with available data for calculating SUE, SUE is negative. For 9 firms 
with negative SUE Mistake is greater than SUE. 
13 For 10 out of 12 f
14 The results are robust to constraining the sample to downward restatements.  
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firms t
ger, more highly levered, make 
smaller
igher leverage than restating firms that issue equity in restated 
period.
ng.  
Overall we find support fo ing firms have better pre-
mistake
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
hat issue equity than by non-issuing firms. Restating firms that issue equity in 
restated period have longer restated periods than firms that do not issue equity. This 
result can be due to the increase in the likelihood of any event happening during longer 
period of time.  
Table 7, Panels D shows characteristics of firms that issue debt in restated period 
and Table 7, Panel E compares this sub-sample to that of restating firms that do not issue 
securities. Restating firms that issue debt are much lar
 mistakes and have longer restated periods than non-issuing sub-sample. As in the 
case of equity issuing firms, the magnitude of the mistake is smaller for debt-issuing 
firms than for non-issuing sub-sample. Unlike equity issuing firms, debt issuing firms do 
not exhibit positive stock returns in pre-mistake period. 
Table 7, Panel F compares restating firms that issue debt in restated period to 
restating firms that issue equity in restated period. We find that firms that issue debt are 
much larger and have h
 Firms that issue equity make larger mistakes in net income than firms that issue 
debt. Since higher net income is more likely to have a greater positive impact on equity 
price than on debt price, this result is consistent with managers inflating earnings to 
obtain better financi
r hypothesis 4: equity issu
 performance than non-issuing firms and debt-issuing firms. We also find support 
for hypothesis 5: debt issuing firms have higher leverage than both equity-issuing and 
non-issuing firms.  
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Table 8 tests hypotheses 4 and 5 in a multivariate setting. Specifically, we 
examine the likelihood of equity and debt issuance as a function of firm and restatement 
(Model 2), 
wise. Please see 
magnitude (ΔNI/Assets) and number of periods 
restated
2 only for downward restatements for which firms 
manage
characteristics by running a logit model. The dependent variable in Model 1 
Equity (Debt), is equal to 1 if the firm issued equity (debt) and zero other
legend to Table 7 for precise definitions of other variables. 
Model 1: Equity = a + β1 Buy-and-hold return before mistake + β2 Leverage  
+ β3 ΔNI/Assets + β4 Number of periods restated + β5 log(Market value) 
Model 2: Debt = a + β1 Buy-and-hold return before mistake + β2 Leverage  
+ β3 ΔNI/Assets + β4 Number of periods restated + β5 log(Market value) 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that β1>0 in Model 1 and insignificant coefficient β1 in Model 2. 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that β2>0 in Model 2 and is insignificant in Model 1. We also 
control for restatement characteristics: its 
 (Number of periods restated). We also control for firm size by including 
logarithm of market capitalization log(Market value). We expect that larger firms are 
more likely to issue equity and security.   
We estimate Models 1 and 
d their earnings upward. As discussed earlier, downward earnings management 
prior to security issuance cannot lead to more favorable financing and therefore must be 
motivated by other considerations.  
We find support for hypothesis 4 and 5. Firms that issue equity have higher return 
before mistake than non-issuing firms (β1>0 in Model 1). Coefficient β1 is statistically 
insignificant in Model 2 suggesting that debt issuing firms do not exhibit high returns 
prior to the start of the restated period. We also find support for hypothesis 2: coefficient 
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β2 on leverage is positive and statistically significant in Model 2 and is indifferent from 
zero in Model 1. The only other significant coefficient in Model 1 is the coefficient β4 on 
the Number of periods restated. This coefficient is also significant in Model 4, which is 
consist
we find that the coefficients on book-to-market and 
sales g wth are not statistically significant in either model. In alternative specification, 
ofitability by including return on assets but find the coefficient to be 
insignif
nvestors 
and cau
ent with univariate analysis. We also find that restating firms are more likely to 
issue debt when they make smaller mistakes as suggested by β3>0. Debt is issued by 
larger firms.  
In results not tabulated we consider other firm and restatement characteristics and 
add them to models 1 and 2 one at a time. To control for growth opportunities we include 
book-to-market and sales growth. Firms with higher growth prospects should be more 
likely to issue securities. However, 
ro
we control for pr
icantly different from zero.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Increasing number of firms restate financial statements (GAO (2002), Huron 
(2005)). Large shareholder losses associated with restatements motivated several 
legislations, including Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz 
(2004)). It has been suggested that firms manage earnings, both within GAAP and 
outside of GAAP, to issue securities at favorable prices. Such practices mislead i
se them to overvalue security issuance. However, as investors learn the true value 
of earnings, they revalue firms that manage earnings downwards. This conjecture was 
called the earnings management hypothesis by Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b). 
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This paper tests earnings management hypothesis using a sample of firms 
restating financial statements during the period of January 1997- June 2002. We find that 
while restating firms issue more equity and debt than control firms, the number of 
issuances is small. Moreover, about 20% of equity and dent issuing firms manage net 
income
ted period. They do not exhibit any abnormal performance prior to debt 
issuanc
ssue debt are considerably larger, more 
highly 
uity. Restating firms that issue debt restate more reports than 
non-issuing firms, but not firms issuing equity.  
Overall our results indicate that only a few restating firms that issue equity obtain 
financing at better terms. 
 downward prior to security issuance, which is inconsistent with the earnings 
management hypothesis. This result implies that security issuance is not the dominant 
reason for violating GAAP for more than 80% of restating firms.  
Restating firms that issue equity outperform the market and the control firms 
subsequent to GAAP violation and prior to equity issuance and perform better one year 
prior to GAAP violation. Earnings management hypothesis is not supported for firms that 
issue debt in resta
e in restated period and one year before mistake. In conclusion, overall results 
suggest limited support for earnings management hypothesis for a sample of firms 
violating GAAP. 
Restating firms that issue equity are larger in market value terms than non-issuing 
firms, have higher pre-mistake return, make smaller downward revisions of net income 
and restate more reports. Restating firms that i
levered, and make smaller downward revisions of net income than non-issuing 
firms and firms issuing eq
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of restating firms 
This table shows descriptive statistics for a sample of publicly traded U.S. companies that announced financial 
statement restatements during the period January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2002.  Restatement announcement dates 
were hand collected from the Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases using key words “restatement” “restat” “revis” 
“adjust” “error” and “responding to guidance from the SEC” during the period January 1, 1997 - June 30, 2002. 
Further details about restatement were found in original and restated financial statements. Resulting sample was 
cross-checked with the sample released by Government Accountability Office. Unlike the GAO sample. We 
excluded restatements that were caused by an adoption of new accounting rules, and retained only restatements 
due to a mistake or an improper interpretation of GAAP rules. ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) is the difference between 
restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by the absolute value of the originally 
reported net income. ΔNI/Assets is the difference between restated net income and originally reported net 
income, standardized by book value of total assets measured one year prior to restatement announcement. 
Downward (upward) restatements are defined as restatements revising net income downward (upward) at 
restatement announcement. 
 
      
Panel A: Frequency of restatements     
Number of restatements Number of firms     
1 426     
2 10     
Total 436     
      
Panel B: Distribution of restating firms by announcement year   
Announcement year 
Number of 
restatements  
1997 56   
1998 58   
1999 104   
2000 105   
2001 63   
2002 60   
Total 446   
      
Panel C: Restatement characteristics     
Sample Mean Q1 Median Q3 N 
Number of restated years 1.34 0.50 1.00 2.00 446 
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) -2.426 -0.732 -0.231 -0.049 430 
ΔNI/Assets -0.043 -0.385 -0.011 -0.002 436 
 
Panel D: Downward and Upward restatements 
  Number of firms %    
Downward restatement 385 86.3%    
Upward restatements 61 13.7%    
      
Panel E: Distribution of ΔNI/Assets for Downward and Upward restatements 
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 N 
Downward restatement -0.457 -0.055 -0.015 -0.004 375 
Upward restatements 0.059 0.003 0.014 0.069 61 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of restating and control firms 
 
Panel A shows descriptive statistics for a sample of firms that restated financial statements during the 
period January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2002.  Firm characteristics are calculated one year prior to the year 
of restatement announcement. Market value is calculated as the product of the closing price at the end 
of the fiscal year and the number of common shares outstanding. Book value is the book value of total 
common equity. Leverage is calculated as the value of the long term debt deflated by end of year 
assets. Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of total common equity to the market value. Panel B 
shows descriptive statistics for the sample of control firms. Control firms are found among all firms 
that did not restate their earnings during the period January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2002 in the same two 
digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size (market value) and book-to-market, 
measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of restatement, and have sufficient data to 
calculate returns one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement. Panel C presents 
Z-value and p-value (P>Z) of the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (2-tailed). *, **, *** indicates 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Characteristics of restating firms 
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 N 
Market value (in millions)     2,259.09           44.34         182.87          682.51      446  
Book value (in millions)     2,375.33           55.78         223.41       1,059.37      446  
Leverage 18.45% 1.14% 13.31% 29.49%     444  
Book-to-market ratio            0.63             0.19             0.44              0.83      446  
      
Panel B: Characteristics of control firms 
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 N 
Market value (in millions)     2,276.91           44.88         183.14          688.37      446  
Book value (in millions)     2,099.64           48.45         187.60          813.37      446  
Leverage 16.44% 0.36% 10.71% 26.46%     446  
Book-to-market ratio            0.63             0.19             0.44              0.84      446  
      
Panel C: Comparison of characteristics of restating and control firms 
  Mean Z-value P>Z  
Market value (in millions) -17.82 -0.10 92.15%  
Book value (in millions) 275.69 1.44 15.01%  
Leverage 2.00% 1.68 9.37% * 
Book-to-market ratio -0.002 -0.03 97.22%   
 
 Table 3.  EQUITY issuance in restated period      
This table shows number of equity issuances in restated period and amounts raised by 436 firms restating financial statements during the period January 1, 1997 - 
June 30, 2002 and control firms. Restated period is defined as the period between the beginning of the period of the first mistake (year or quarter) and the 
restatement announcement.  Control firms are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2002 in the 
same two digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size (market value) and book-to-market, measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of 
restatement, and have sufficient data to calculate returns one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement. Panel A shows Chi-square test for binary 
variables to compare number of issuances for restating and control samples. Panel C presents Z-value and p-value (P>Z) of the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (2-
tailed) for the difference in mean amounts raised. *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
         
Panel A: EQUITY issuances in restated period 
  Number of equity issuances Number of issuing firms   
Restating firms 85 68     
Control firms 48 41     
Chi-square test for binary variables 11.12 7.62     
P-value of chi-square test <0.01*** 0.01***     
         
Panel B. Number of EQUITY issuances per firm 
Number of equity issuances by the same firm Restating Firms Control Firms     
1 53 35     
2 13 5     
3 2 0     
4 0 1     
Total 68 41     
         
Panel C. Principal amount of EQUITY raised (in millions)   
Sample Mean Q1 Median Q3 N Difference 
  
Total Amount 
Raised            Z-value P>Z 
Restating Firms $9,205.40  $109.59  $35.15  $59.45  $137.55  84 0.28 0.78 
Control Firms $3,876.10  $82.47  $35.20  $57.60  $139.20  47     
         
Panel D. Principal amount of EQUITY raised (as a percent of total assets)   
Sample Mean Q1 Median Q3 N Difference 
            Z-value P>Z 
Restating Firms 33.76% 9.47% 23.12% 42.47% 84 -0.82  0.41 
Control Firms 40.67% 8.90% 25.26% 54.48% 47     
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Table 4.  DEBT issuance in restated period  
This table shows number of debt issuances in restated period and amounts raised by 436 firms restating financial 
statements during the period January 1, 1997 - June 30, 2002 and control firms. Restated period is defined as the 
period between the beginning of the period of the first mistake (year or quarter) and the restatement 
announcement.  Control firms are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period 
January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2002 in the same two digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size 
(market value) and book-to-market, measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of restatement, and have 
sufficient data to calculate returns one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement. Panel A 
shows Chi-square test for binary variables to compare number of issuances for restating and control samples. 
Panel C presents Z-value and p-value (P>Z) of the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (2-tailed) for the difference in mean 
amount raised. *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
     
Panel A: DEBT Issuances in restated period   
  
Number 
of debt 
issuances 
Number of issuing 
firms 
Restating firms 128 28 
Control firms 72 18 
Chi-square test for binary variables 13.4063 2.2921 
P-value of chi-square test <0.01*** 0.13 
     
Panel B: Number of DEBT Issuances per firm   
Number of equity issuances by the same firm 
Restating 
Firms Control Firms 
1 11 7 
2 6 4 
3 4 1 
5 0 2 
6 1 0 
7 0 1 
8 1 1 
9 1 0 
11 1 1 
14 1 0 
15 1 0 
18 0 1 
29 1 0 
Total  28 18 
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Table 4, continued.  DEBT issuance in restated period 
         
Panel C: Principal amount of DEBT raised (in millions)   
Sample Mean Q1 Median Q3 N Difference 
  Total Amount Raised            Z-value P>Z 
Restating Firms $21,162.70  $167.96  $2.60  $150.00  $269.00  126  -2.42 0.02** 
Control Firms $15,592.00  $216.56  $100.00  $200.00  $250.00  72      
         
Panel D: Principal amount of DEBT raised (as a percent of total assets)   
Sample Mean Q1 Median Q3 N Difference 
              Z-value P>Z 
Restating Firms 1.91% 0.05% 0.38% 1.70% 126  -2.64 0.01*** 
Control Firms 2.88% 0.24% 1.12% 2.31% 72      
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Table 5. Short-term market reaction to initial announcement of misstated earnings  
This table shows the regression of abnormal return at the announcement of initial earnings containing 
material mistakes on standardized unexpected earnings and equity and debt dummies and descriptive 
statistics of all variables. The dependent variable  is market adjusted return for a 3 day window (-1; +1) 
relative to the earnings announcement on day zero using value equally CRSP market index as a proxy for 
the market return. Mistake is the amount by which earnings are misstated. Equity (Debt) is a dummy that 
equals one for quarters in the restated period preceding equity (debt) issuance. In Panel E, Model 1 
estimates equation (1), Model 2 estimates equation (2), Model 3 estimates equation (3), Model 4 estimates 
equation (4). *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
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Panel A: Full Sample       
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std N 
Rt 0.0012 -0.0394 0.0045 0.0470 0.0989 1843 
SUE -0.0042 -0.0022 0.0000 0.0011 0.0231 1843 
Mistake 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0151 1843 
       
Panel B: Non-zero mistake      
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std N 
Rt -0.0102 -0.0552 -0.0013 0.0480 0.1160 518 
SUE -0.0129 -0.0129 -0.0034 -0.0003 0.0390 518 
Mistake 0.0091 0.0008 0.0032 0.0102 0.0273 518 
       
Panel C: Non-zero mistake and equity=1     
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std N 
Rt -0.0295 -0.0808 -0.0241 0.0471 0.0971 79 
SUE -0.0116 -0.0171 -0.0027 -0.0002 0.0495 79 
Mistake 0.0089 0.0005 0.0027 0.0154 0.0392 79 
       
Panel D: Non-zero mistake and debt=1     
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std N 
Rt -0.0014 -0.0332 -0.0002 0.0351 0.0541 40 
SUE -0.0016 -0.0034 -0.0017 0.0004 0.0076 40 
Mistake 0.0013 -0.0001 0.0013 0.0027 0.0075 40 
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Table 5 (continued). Short-term market reaction to initial announcement of 
misstated earnings  
 
Panel E: Multivariate Analysis – Full Sample 
        X=Equity X=Debt 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      
Intercept alpha 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 
  1.17 0.97 1.35 1.05 
      
SUE b1 0.432 0.897 0.850 0.896 
  2.53*** 4.21*** 3.93*** 4.20*** 
      
Mistake b2  0.981 0.946 0.985 
   3.83*** 3.33*** 3.84*** 
      
X b3   -0.023 -0.007 
    -2.62*** -0.52 
      
Sue*X b4   1.365 2.684 
    1.92* 1.09 
      
Mistake*X b5   1.690 1.196 
    1.78* 0.48 
      
N  1843 1843 1843 1843 
Adjusted R-square  0.96% 1.97% 2.25% 1.87% 
F  6.39*** 9.56*** 7.39***  
      
b1-b2   -0.0839 -0.0961 -0.0892 
t value   -0.46 -0.39  -0.49 
      
b1+b4    2.215 3.579 
t value    3.29*** 1.45 
      
b2+b5    2.636 2.181 
t value    2.91*** 0.88 
      
(b1+b4)-(b2+b5)    -0.421 1.398 
t value       -1.54 1.09 
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Table 5 (continued). Short-term market reaction to initial announcement of 
misstated earnings  
 
Panel F: Multivariate Analysis - Downward restatements 
        X=Equity X=Debt 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      
Intercept alpha 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
  0.55 0.37 0.76 0.44 
      
SUE b1 0.415 0.875 0.828 0.874 
  2.43** 4.06*** 3.78*** 4.05*** 
      
Mistake b2  0.964 0.930 0.969 
   3.72*** 3.21*** 3.72*** 
      
X b3   -0.022 -0.005 
    -2.44** -0.40 
      
Sue*X b4   1.388 2.706 
    1.95** 1.09 
      
Mistake*X b5   1.707 1.212 
    1.80* 0.49 
      
N  1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 
Adjusted R-square  1.00% 2.07% 2.36% 1.96% 
F  5.88*** 8.90*** 6.91*** 4.26*** 
      
b1-b2   -0.0896 -0.1021 -0.0950 
t value   -0.49 -0.41 -0.52 
      
b1+b4    2.215 3.579 
t value    3.29*** 1.45 
      
b2+b5    2.636 2.181 
t value    2.91*** 0.88 
      
(b1+b4)-(b2+b5)    -0.421 1.398 
t value       -1.54 1.09 
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Table 6. Abnormal Returns before Equity and Debt Issuance 
This table shows abnormal returns for a sample of firms that restated financial statements during the period January 1, 
1997 to June 30, 2002.  Market model CAR is market cumulative abnormal return, for which abnormal return is calculated 
as the difference between firm’s return and market model predicted return. Market adjusted CAR is cumulative abnormal 
return, for which abnormal return is calculated as the difference between firm’s return and market return. BHAR is the buy-
and-hold abnormal return calculated as the difference between firm’s return and a return on a control firm. Control firms 
are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2002 in the same 
two digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size (market value) and book-to-market, measured one fiscal 
year prior to the announcement of restatement, and have sufficient data to calculate returns one year prior to mistake and 
one year subsequent to restatement.    ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) is the difference between restated net income and originally 
reported net income, standardized by the absolute value of the originally reported net income.   ΔNI /Assets is the 
difference between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by book value of total assets 
measured on year prior to restatement announcement. *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
        
Panel A:  Restated period abnormal returns before EQUITY issuance (Mistake, Issuance)     
Daily Abnormal 
Return Market model parameters estimation period Mean Median St Dev N T-value 
Market model CAR  (-254, -5) relative to mistake -0.12% 0.07% 1.64% 42 -0.48  
Market model CAR  (-501, -250) relative to mistake 0.21% 0.09% 0.78% 32 1.49  
Market adjusted CAR   0.34% 0.19% 0.68% 42 3.27 *** 
BHAR Relative to control firm 0.45% 0.14% 1.02% 42 2.84 *** 
BHAR Relative to pre-mistake performance 0.31% 0.11% 1.03% 42 1.91 ** 
        
Panel B:  Restated period abnormal returns before DEBT issuance (Mistake, Issuance)     
Daily abnormal 
Return Market model parameters estimation period Mean Median St Dev N T-value 
Market model CAR  (-254, -5) relative to mistake -0.44% -0.07% 1.89% 27 -1.21  
Market model CAR  (-501, -250) relative to mistake -0.27% -0.07% 0.97% 27 -1.41  
Market adjusted CAR   -0.01% -0.03% 0.21% 27 -0.28  
BHAR Relative to control firm -0.08% -0.08% 0.55% 27 -0.73  
BHAR Relative to pre-mistake performance 0.03% -0.01% 0.53% 27 0.30   
        
Panel C:  EQUITY issuing firms abnormal returns one year prior to mistake  (1 year, Mistake)  
Daily Abnormal 
Return Market model parameters estimation period Mean Median St Dev N T-value 
Market model CAR  (-501, -250) relative to mistake 0.09% 0.02% 0.65% 32 0.82  
Market adjusted CAR   0.13% 0.08% 0.39% 42 2.19 ** 
BHAR  Relative to control firm -0.02% 0.07% 0.74% 42 -0.21   
        
Panel D:  DEBT issuing firms abnormal returns one year prior to mistake (1 year, Mistake)  
Daily Abnormal 
Return Market model parameters estimation period Mean Median St Dev N T-value 
Market model CAR  (-501, -250) relative to mistake -0.22% -0.06% 1.03% 26 1.06  
Market adjusted CAR   -0.01% -0.01% 0.29% 27 -1.20  
BHAR  Relative to control firm -0.02% 0.04% 0.41% 27 -0.18   
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics for restating firms conditional on security issuance 
This table shows descriptive statistics for a sample of firms that restated financial statements during the period 
January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2002.  Firm characteristics are calculated one year prior to the year of restatement 
announcement. Market value is calculated as the product of the closing price at the end of the fiscal year and 
the number of common shares outstanding. Book value is the book value of total common equity. Leverage is 
calculated as the value of the long term debt deflated by end of year assets. Book-to-market is the ratio of book 
value of total common equity to the market value. Buy-and-hold return before mistake is the daily buy-and-
hold return estimated one year before the start of the restated period. ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) is the difference 
between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by the absolute value of the 
originally reported net income. ΔNI/Assets is the difference between restated net income and originally reported 
net income, standardized by book value of total assets measured on year prior to restatement announcement. 
Number of periods restated is in years. Comparison of sub-samples is performed using Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test (2-tailed). *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
      
Panel A: Characteristics of restating firms that do not issue equity or debt  (NO ISSUANCE) 
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 N 
Market value (in millions) 2,082.72 37.54 128.45 535.35 360 
Book value (in millions) 1,950.36 46.45 206.61 778.58 360 
Leverage 18.24% 1.13% 11.97% 28.69% 358 
Book-to-market 0.66 0.19 0.45 0.87 360 
Buy-and-hold return before mistake 0.09% -0.13% 0.00% 0.20% 349 
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) -282.73% -77.81% -29.73% -6.13% 344 
ΔNI/Assets -47.05% -4.76% -1.19% -0.21% 350 
Number of periods restated 1.20 0.50 1.00 1.75 360 
      
Panel B: Characteristics of restating firms that issue EQUITY   
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 N 
Market value (in millions) 2,238.63 118.23 330.64 1,089.74 68 
Book value (in millions) 2,446.86 81.54 248.35 1,203.22 68 
Leverage 17.15% 0.43% 9.57% 29.69% 68 
Book-to-market 0.52 0.18 0.32 0.65 68 
Buy-and-hold return before mistake 0.25% -0.06% 0.12% 0.49% 42 
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) -100.84% -72.00% -13.55% -1.06% 68 
ΔNI/Assets -4.28% -5.16% -0.96% -0.08% 68 
Number of periods restated 1.97 1.00 1.75 2.75 68 
      
Panel C: Comparison of characteristics of restating firms that issue equity and restating firms that do 
not issue equity or debt (EQUITY vs NO ISSUANCE) 
  Mean Z-value P>Z (two sided) 
Market value (in millions) 155.91 3.38 <0.01 *** 
Book value (in millions) 496.50 1.56 0.12  
Leverage -1.09% -0.58 0.56  
Book-to-market -0.14 -1.37 0.17  
Buy-and-hold return before mistake 0.16% 2.63 <0.01 *** 
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) 1.82 1.94 0.05 ** 
ΔNI/Assets 0.43 0.54 0.59  
Number of periods restated 0.77 5.53 <0.01 *** 
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Table 7, continued: Descriptive statistics for restating firms conditional on security issuance 
      
Panel D: Characteristics of restating firms that issue DEBT   
            
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 N 
Market value (in millions) 7,826.09 961.76 3,143.94 10,023.23 28 
Book value (in millions) 11,400.22 2,241.21 5,538.57 14,084.30 28 
Leverage 28.92% 16.95% 27.52% 38.59% 28 
Book-to-market 0.49 0.23 0.40 0.62 28 
Buy-and-hold return before mistake 0.08% -0.06% 0.07% 0.15% 27 
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) -9.96% -16.12% -4.59% -0.93% 28 
ΔNI/Assets -0.38% -0.40% -0.18% -0.05% 28 
Number of periods restated 2.19 1.13 2.00 3.00 28 
      
Panel E: Comparison of characteristics of restating firms that issue debt and restating firms that do not issue 
equity or debt (DEBT vs NO ISSUANCE) 
  Mean Z-value P>Z (two sided) 
Market value (in millions) 5,743.37 6.10 <0.01 *** 
Book value (in millions) 9,449.86 7.30 <0.01 *** 
Leverage 10.68% 3.67 <0.01 *** 
Book-to-market -0.17 -0.50 0.62  
Buy-and-hold return before mistake -0.01% 1.11 0.27  
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) 272.77% 3.95 <0.01 *** 
ΔNI/Assets 46.67% 3.98 <0.01 *** 
Number of periods restated 0.99 4.47 <0.01 *** 
      
Panel F: Comparison of characteristics of restating firms that issue debt and restating firms that issue equity 
(DEBT vs EQUITY) 
  Mean Z-value P>Z (two sided) 
Market value (in millions) 5,197.51 4.38 <0.01 *** 
Book value (in millions) 9,948.21 5.92 <0.01 *** 
Leverage 12.83% 3.15 <0.01 *** 
Book-to-market 0.04 0.96 0.34  
Buy-and-hold return before mistake -0.17% -1.23 0.22  
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) 103.89% 1.67 0.10 * 
ΔNI/Assets 3.90% 2.58 <0.01 *** 
Number of periods restated -0.05 0.00 1.00   
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Table 8. Likelihood of equity and debt issuance 
 
This table shows logit model of the likelihood of equity and debt issuance by restating firms. The analysis 
is performed for downward restatements only. Downward (upward) restatements are defined as 
restatements revising net income downward (upward) at restatement announcement. The dependent 
variable in Model 1 (Model 2), Equity (Debt), is equal to 1 if the firm issued equity (debt) and zero 
otherwise. Buy-and-hold return before mistake is the daily buy-and-hold return estimated one year before 
the start of the restated period. Leverage is calculated one year prior to the year of restatement 
announcement as the value of the long term debt deflated by end of year assets. ΔNI/Assets is the difference 
between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by book value of total assets 
measured on year prior to restatement announcement. Number of periods restated is in years. Market value 
is calculated as the product of the closing price at the end of the fiscal year one year prior to the year of 
restatement announcement and the number of common shares outstanding. *, **, *** indicates significance 
at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
 
  Model 1 – Equity issuance Model 2 – Debt issuance 
  Estimate Chi-Square   Estimate Chi-Square   
Intercept -3.378 29.23 *** -7.567 30.70 *** 
Buy-and-hold return before mistake 99.690 6.20 *** -59.152 0.24  
Leverage -1.190 1.08  2.327 2.81 * 
ΔNI/Assets 6.144 2.40  102.900 5.28 ** 
Number of periods restated 0.518 9.61 *** 0.687 8.20 *** 
log(Market value) 0.108 1.38  0.632 16.66 *** 
       
Likelihood ratio 20.44 ***  65.05 ***  
Number of observations 342     342     
 
